In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today.
University of Queensland, Australia - ORCID: 0000-0001-5707-7605
University of Queensland, Australia - ORCID: 0000-0002-1150-3848
Titolo del capitolo
Foundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis
Autori
Deborah Brown, Brian Key
Lingua
English
DOI
10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.06
Opera sottoposta a peer review
Anno di pubblicazione
2023
Copyright
© 2023 Author(s)
Licenza d'uso
Licenza dei metadati
Titolo del libro
Reading Descartes
Sottotitolo del libro
Consciousness, Body, and Reasoning
Curatori
Andrea Strazzoni, Marco Sgarbi
Opera sottoposta a peer review
Numero di pagine
206
Anno di pubblicazione
2023
Copyright
© 2023 Author(s)
Licenza d'uso
Licenza dei metadati
Editore
Firenze University Press
DOI
10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8
ISBN Print
979-12-215-0168-1
eISBN (pdf)
979-12-215-0169-8
eISBN (epub)
979-12-215-0170-4
Collana
Knowledge and its Histories
ISSN della collana
3035-5974
e-ISSN della collana
3035-5923