Affectivity – especially the emotions – are proved to be a key-point of ethical formation. This book aims at clarifying which thesis the neo-aristotelian Virtue Ethics hold about emotion education, by integrating philosophy of education, philosophy of emotions and moral epistemology. Virtue Ethics, compared to deontology and utilitarianism-consequentialism, offers the more appropriate framework to conceive the relations between education, emotions and ethics. The volume discusses cognitive-evaluative theories of emotions and address the anti-rationalist challenge, based on empirical evidence about how emotions impact on moral judgments. Anti-rationalism, it is argued, is incompatible with the purpose of shaping the emotions looking at our best moral reasons. Then, two Aristotelian educational theses are put forward: all the emotional dispositions – both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ – should be cultivated, and all the emotional dispositions admit an appropriate moral form.
Italian University Line, Italy - ORCID: 0000-0001-7869-8451
Book Title
Formazione etica ed emozioni
Book Subtitle
Prospettive di virtue ethics neo-aristotelica
Authors
Ariele Niccoli
Peer Reviewed
Number of Pages
150
Publication Year
2020
Copyright Information
© 2020 Author(s)
Content License
Metadata License
Publisher Name
Firenze University Press
DOI
10.36253/978-88-5518-117-4
ISBN Print
978-88-5518-116-7
eISBN (pdf)
978-88-5518-117-4
eISBN (xml)
978-88-5518-118-1
Series Title
Premio Ricerca «Città di Firenze»
Series ISSN
2705-0289
Series E-ISSN
2705-0297