This paper explores the evolution of municipal debt restructuring in the Spanish Crown of Aragon between 1732 and 1742, focusing on the widespread concordias, negotiated agreements between municipalities and their creditors. These were mechanisms for avoiding municipal insolvency and bankruptcy through negotiated debt settlements, sometimes involving the mediation of royal judges. In the early eighteenth century, overdindebtedness triggered intense disputes over the legality, legitimacy, and impact of these pacts. The paper reconstructs a jurisdictional conflict involving municipalities, creditors, and royal courts and councils, culminating in King Felipe V’s 1738 decree prohibiting judicial intervention in concordias. Drawing on underused archival sources, the paper reveals how notions of public good, legal equity, and political power shaped debt policy.
Pyrenean Institute of Ecology, Spain - ORCID: 0000-0001-9077-4306
Chapter Title
From «util y combeniente, y aun necesario» to «perjudicialissimas, injustas, y contra todo fundamento legal»: redefining municipal debt restructuring in the Spanish Crown of Aragon (1732-1742)
Authors
Íñigo Ena Sanjuán
Language
English
DOI
10.36253/979-12-215-0963-2.11
Peer Reviewed
Publication Year
2026
Copyright Information
© 2026 Author(s)
Content License
Metadata License
Book Title
Gestione del rischio, insolvenza e bancarotta nel mondo premoderno (secc. XIII-XVIII) / Risk management, insolvency, and bankruptcy in the pre-modern world (13th-18th centuries)
Editors
Angela Orlandi
Peer Reviewed
Number of Pages
568
Publication Year
2026
Copyright Information
© 2026 Author(s)
Content License
Metadata License
Publisher Name
Firenze University Press
DOI
10.36253/979-12-215-0963-2
ISBN Print
979-12-215-0962-5
eISBN (pdf)
979-12-215-0963-2
eISBN (xml)
979-12-215-0964-9
Series Title
Datini Studies in Economic History
Series ISSN
2975-1241
Series E-ISSN
2975-1195